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INDUSTRIAL LAW CASES 
PART-TIME WORKER NOT ENTITLED TO SENIORITY 
ALLOWANCE 
Auckland Clerical and Office Staff Employees I.U.W. v. Consolidated Hotels 
Ltd, Indust rial Court, Rotorua, March 1977, Jamieson J. 
The Auckland Clerical and Office Staff 
Employees Industrial Union of Workers 
(hereafter referred to as "the Un1on ) 
sought JUdgment for penalties under ss 147, 
148 and 151 of the Industrial Relations Act 
1973 {hereafter called "the Act") for two 
breaches of the New Zealand Licensed 
Hotel Clerical Workers Collective Agreement 
{hereafter called "the Award, " per s 82 (9) 
(b) of the Act as amended by s 10 (2) of 
the Industrial Relations Amendment Act 
(No. 2) 1976). That award is dated 16 
December 1975 and is recorded at 75 8 A. 
9915. The alleged breach took place at 
the Putaruru Hotel , owned and operated by 
Defendant, Consolidated Hotels Ltd. 
The first breach alleged by the Union con-
cerned non-payment of a continuous service 
allowance, per Clause 2 (a) of the Award, 
to a part-t1me worker. The second alleged 
breach involved non-payment of a sh1ft 
allowance to the same part-time worker 
(Mrs J . H. Cassidy) . The Union d1d not 
seek recovery of money payable under the 
Award but, instead, i n the words of Jamie-
son J " pressed for the max1mum penalty." 
The Court found no breach of award with 
respect to the first complaint and, although 
a breach was found regarding the second 
complaint, chose not to inflict any penalty 
Because the JUdicial approach to the first 
c..omplaint 1s so markedly dissimilar to the 
JUdicial approach to the second complaint, 
a nd because the approach to that first 
a lleged breach is so out of keeping with 
nil the precedents set in th1s area (and 
noted in this Journal ), this note will canvass 
in some detail the facts of the case and 
the rationale of the decision. It 1s submitted, 
w i th all due respect, that the Court has 
approached the fir~t complaint with ' 'the 
incertain and crooked cord of discretion" 
instead of 'the golden and streight met-
wand* of the law. [sic) " (4 Coke's Institutes 
~ 1. as quoted in Inland Revenue Commis-
sioners v Westminster (Duke) [1936] A.C 
1 at 19} . 
The Award pertains to three types of 
• Prec 1s1on or accurato measure (Ed.). 
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hotel clerical workers: full-time, part- time 
and casual. It is conceded by all parties 
that Mrs Cassidy IS a part-time worker, and 
her hourly rates of pay are set out in 
Clause 8. Part-time workers receive a pre-
mium rate. vis-a-vis full-time workers and, 
tn turn, casual workers, per Clause 10, re-
ceive a premium rate vis-a-v1s part-t1me 
workers. 
The Union submitted that Mrs Cass1dy 
should rece1ve a continuous serv1ce allow-
ance per the terms of the follow1 ng sub-
paragraph, set out in full, of Clause 2 (a): 
" Any worker upon complet rng one 
year's contrnuous serv1ce with the same 
hotel or w1th the same employer shall 
be paid $2.87 per week in addition to 
the wages set out herein.' ' 
The next sub-paragraph, the fourth sub-
paragraph in Clause 2 (a) reads as follows: 
"No worker shall have his wages 
reduced by v1rtue of changes in this 
agreement.'' 
Clause 2 is entitled " Wages, ' and it is 
undeniable that the entire clause. Including 
Clause 2 (a) is primarily aimed at full-t1me 
workers. (The word "wages' ord1narily 
connotes a regular, periodic payment made 
to full-time workers, either weekly or fort-
nightly). The first sub-paragraph sets ou t a 
scale or wages depending on three var-
ables : sex of employee (obsolete after 1 
P.pril 1977); number of clerical staff rn the 
office ; and rank of employee in the o ff1ce. 
The first sub-paragraph, and t he second 
and fifth sub-paragraphs which make cer-
ta in except1ons to the scale for big offices 
nnd for workers over 22 years of age, are 
undeniably applicable only to full-t1me wor-
kers . The th1rd and fourth sub-paragraphs, 
however, as set out above, beg1n wi th the 
words " Any worker" and "No worker" re-
soectively, and pnma tac1e apply to all 
three types of employment 
The employer argued that Clause 2 
("Wages" ) and Clause 8 ("Part-time W or-
kers ' ) were mutually exclus1ve, and that 
Clause 8 in particular is a code, and is 
the complete employment contract for part-
time workers. This interpretation would ru le 
out inclusion of part-ti me workers under 
any sub-paragraph of Clause 2 {a). How-
ever, the Court properly decided against 
this submission, and noted that many other 
provisions of the Award, in addition to 
Clause 8, apply to part-time workers. Clause 
11 {"Record of Service" ). Clause 13 (" Dis-
putes '' ), Clause 14 (" Personal Grievances" ), 
Clause 15 {"Under-rate Workers'' ), Clause 
16 ("Unqualified Preference" ), Clause 17 
("Deduction of Union Subscriptions"), 
Clause 18 (' 'Right of Entry"), Clause 19 
("Wages Book" ), and Clause 20 C' Equal 
Pay Act 1972'' ), all must apply equally to 
any sort of employee. In add ition, when i t 
was thought necessary to exclude one type 
of worker , the exclusion is expressly set 
out, as in Clause 12 {" Terms of Employ-
ment" ), which begins " Except in the case 
of casual workers .. . " Nor could it be 
seriously argued that the Clause 5 ('' Con-
ditions as to Offices" ) requirements regard-
ing toilets, soap, hot water, and towelling 
apply only to fu ll-time workers. Generally 
an Award provision (especially when it 
beg1ns with the phrase " Any worker" or 
" No worker" ) would seem to apply to all 
types of employment unless express excep-
tions are made, as in Clause 12. 
The Court might have come to an equit-
able result, and denied the Union's first 
claim, by interpreting the words ' 'Any wor-
ker" in the third paragraph as being limited 
by the final phrase in the sentence "i n addi-
tion to the wages set out herein ." It was 
open to the Court to interpret "herein" as 
a reference to Clause 2 (and not the 
enti re award} and to interpret "wages" as 
a reference to the weekly scales set out 
in the first sub-paragraph of Clause 2 (a). 
(On the other hand, the word 'wages" is 
not always indicative of full-time weekly 
earnings. The word is used in Clauses 12 
(a). 12 (bL 12 (e) , 14 {e), 15 {a}, 15 (b) , 
15 (c) , 15 {e), 16 (e), 17, 19 (a) and 20 as 
refe rring to moneys earned either as a 
weekly, 40-hour wage, or as the multiple 
of an hourly rate multiplied by the number 
of hours worked) . 
The Court, however, eschewed carefu I 
statu tory interpretation and substituted its 
own value judgment, saying that it would 
be "anomalous to apply an allowance of 
$2.87 to full-time and part-time workers 
equally. The Court disregarded the phrase 
" Any wo rker" without discussion and con-
eluded that the parties " could not have 
intended " such a result. 
The substantive ''anomaly" referred to by 
Jamieson J. is simply that a part-time wor-
ker will derive " a greater proportionate 
benefit from the allowance than a full-time 
worker." The full-time worker gets an addi-
ti onal 7 cent3 an hour, while a part-time 
wo rker on. say, 20 hours a week. would get 
en additional 14 cents an hour, or twice as 
mu ch. The Award. however, is replete with 
~u c h anomalies, much more striking -
such as the more than 20 cents an hour 
bonus for part-time workers generally. {If a 
two-person office is chosen , the bonus is 
closer to 40 cents an hour). And the wage 
for a " casual " worker, in a Monday to 
Friday 40-hour week, amounts to more 
than double the average full time wage. 
This Award, and other Awards, generally 
make the employer pay a premium for the 
privi lege of employing part-time workers. 
Seen in that light, a uniform cont inuou s 
c;ervice payment is not " anomalous'' in the 
least. 
Nevertheless, the most significant aspect 
of th is decision is not the substantive ans-
Ner, but the legal reasoning employed to 
~et that answer. The Court was willing to 
substitute its own value judgment for the 
plain words (" Any worker") of the Award. 
Such an apprcach is in plain conflict wi th 
many previous decisions of the Industrial 
Court. In Pickford (Inspector of Awards) v. 
Canadian Construction Co. Ltd. 17 July 
1975 (noted at (1976) N.Z.J .I.R . 20) the 
Court ruled , over a dissenting judgment, 
that meal money was payable to shift-
workers on ordinary time That result was 
"anomalous,'' and probably not in concert 
with the original intent of the parties, but 
it was necessary by the plain meaning of 
the meal money clause. 
More recently , in the Wattie Canneries 
case, decided on 20 September 1976 and 
noted in these pages at (1976} N.Z.J .I.R. 
75, the Court decided that dirt money must 
be paid to electrical workers who perform 
their task up in the air, because of the 
plain meaning of the words in the sub-
clause. It is relevant that in that case the 
Court ignored the Title of the relevant 
clause ("Dirt Money·') and preferred the 
language of the sub-clause. The instant case 
represents the opposite approach. 
And finally, in another recent decision 
Richards (Inspector of Awards v. Mayor of 
Wanganui, 20 August 1976 (IC 42 / 76), the 
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Court reached another "anomalous" decis-
Ion by finding that a poorly drafted award 
required double payments for travelling 
tradesmen. 
Significantly, the Court reverted to a 
strict statutory interpretation approach to 
deal with the second complaint, and found 
that a shift allowance was applicable to 
part-time workers. like Mrs Cassidy, in 
spite of the anomalies. The shift allowance 
in question, per Clause 3 (d), is payable to 
any worker who starts work after 12 noon 
and finishes before 11.30 p.m. This means 
that full employment between 11.00 a.m. 
and 8.00 p.m. does not attract the shift 
allowance, but a two-hour stint between 
1.00 p.m. and 3.00 p.m. would attract the 
allowance. As the Court said, the full-time 
worker "might have good reason to feel 
hard-done by." Furthermore, the shift 
allowance is payable, per Clause 3 (d), ''in 
addition to the weekly wage." So Mrs 
Cassidy receives a weekly wage in so far 
as a shift allowance is concerned, but not 
with respect to a continuous service allow-
ance. 
It is submitted that this judgment itself 
s anomalous, both with respect to incon-
sis tencies within the two prongs of the 
decision and with respect to all previous 
decisions of the Industrial Court whtch 
have considered problems of interpretation. 
Whether the approach to the first com-
plaint heralds a new flexible approach by 
the lndustnal Court remains to be seen. 0 
STATUTORY PERSONAL GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE 
NOT AVAILABLE TO WORKERS NOT COVERED 
BY AWARD 
Auckland Freezing Works and Abattoir Employees Industrial Union of 
Workers v. Te Kuiti Borough Council. Court of Appeal , Wellington, 
23 November 1976 (C.A. 89/76). Richmond P., Woodhouse and 
Cooke J. J. 
Two slaughtermen at the Te Kuit1 Bor-
ouqh Council abattoir joined the Auckland 
Freezing Works I.U.W. (hereafter. " the 
Union"). There is no award or collective 
agreement applicable to employment at this 
abattoir, and their membership in the union 
was thereby voluntary . The Borough Coun-
cil dismissed the two men in question, and 
the Union sought a decision from the 
Industrial Court, under Clause (g) of the 
standard procedure for settlement of per-
sonal grievances set out in section 117 ( 4) 
of the Indust rial Relations Act 1973. 
The judge of the Indust rial Court, upon 
the motion of the Borough Council, stated 
R case for the Court of Appeal under sec-
tion 51 of the Act. The question for the 
Court of Appeal was whether the standard 
procedure set out in s. 117 (4) is available 
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in the case of a worker whose employment 
is not covered by an award or collect1ve 
agreement. 
The Court of Appeal noted that the stan-
dard procedure set out in subsect1on (4) 
? of s. 150 would be brought to life by sub-
sections (2) and (3) of s. 150: that is. by 
inclusion in an award or agreement. Opera-
tion of the procedure can only commence 
after such incorporation. The procedure can 
not have legal effect in vacuo: like most 
modern appliances it can not operate until 
plugged in. 
The Court of Appeal tr'lerefore concluded 
that the standard procedure was not avai 1-
Court would, therefore, have no jurisdiction 
to hear any referral from an ad hoc griev-
able to the Union in this case: the Industrial 
dnce committee. 0 
"VICTIMISATION'1 PROTECTION EXTENDED TO WORKERS 
NOT COVERED BY AWARD 
New Zealand Insurance Guild Union of Workers v. Insurance Council of 
New Zealand. Industrial Court, Wellington. 19 November 1976 (I.C. 54/76). 
Jamieson J. 
This dec i s i on of the I n dust r i a I Co u rt is 
especially important for those unions with 
a salary bar. The Court concluded that 
section 1 SO of the Industrial Relations Act 
1973 (usually referred to as the "victimisa-
tion" section) can protect workers who are 
above the salary bar and thereby not cov-
ered by an award. 
The worker in this case, Mr R. J. Estal l, 
took employment with the defendant lnsu 
a nee Cnu nci I (hereafter, "the Cou nci I") as 
an Assistant Technical Officer in 1972, and 
apparently. joined the plaintiff I nsu ranee 
Workers Union (hereafter, "the Guild" ) at 
the same time. 
After two years as an Assistant Technical 
Officer in Christchurch, Estall was promot-
ed to a position in Wellington, where he 
~ad more responsibilities, as the only tech-
nical officer in that reg1on He received a 
h1gher salary as of November 1974, and 
because of the salary bar in the I nsu ranee 
Workers Award (as recorded at 75 B.A. 
5493) he was no longer covered by the 
terms of that Award. Such employees are 
in fact in an ind1v1dual contract of employ-
ment with their employer, although their 
individual contract may (or may not) incor-
porate terms of their previous award. Estall 
remained a member of the Guild, apparently 
thinkmg that he was covered by the award 
in every particular except salary. 
After certain personality clashes and oth-
er problems in the Wellington office, Estal l 
was transferred laterally, with no loss in 
salary, to a position in the Chief Technical 
Office. This lateral move took place in Nov-
ember of 1975. 
At this stage Estall and the Guild took 
steps to set up a personal grievance com-
mittee under Clause 22 of the Award (per 
s. 117 of the Industrial Relations Act 1973) 
nn the grounds that his employment had 
been affectec1 to his disadvantage by the 
transfer. The Council then gave Estall not-
ice, as of 8 December 1975, terminating 
his employment but paying his salary to 
11 May 1976. 
The Guild brought an action under s. 1 SO 
of the Industrial Relations Act , arguing 
that Estall had made a claim for a benefit 
under an award (s. 1 SO (1) (d) ) or, in the 
alternative, that he had submitted a per-
sonal grievance to his employer (s. 1 SO 
(1) (f) ). The Council argued that as Estall 
was not covered by an award, he could 
not claim the benefit of same, nor could 
he pursue any statutory personal grievance 
remedy. 
The Court ruled , however, that claims 
made under a reasonable, albeit mistaken, 
belief are protected, and followed the deci-
sion of Blair J. in Inspector of Awards v. 
Armoured Transport-Mayne-Nickless Ltd, 67 
8 .A. 763. In that case Mr Justice Blair held 
that only if a claim is unjustified and un-
reasonable might it be treated as no claim 
at all and not entitled to protection under 
the victimisation clause. In the instant case, 
therefore, the employee had made a reas-
onable, though mistaken claim and the 
''broad cloak of protection" would be 
thrown round him. Furthermore, the refer-
ence to ''personal grievance" in s. 1 SO ( 1) 
(f) was not limited to the remedy set out 
in model form in s. 117, but included what 
might be called common law contract dis-
putes. 
The Court found further that the employer 
Council had not satisfied the onus of proof 
in ss 2 of s. 1 SO; the employer had not 
demonstrated that the dismissal was for 
some reason unrelated to his claim. 
The employer had therefore violated s. 
1 SO and the Court inflicted a penalty of 
$50 against the Council , plus $350 lost 
wages and reinstatement of Estall in the 
position last held prior to his dismissal. 0 
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M UTUALLY EXCLUSIVE REMEDIES: A COMMENT ON 
SECTION 150 AND THE MODEL IN SECTION 117 
The Te Kuiti Abattoir case and the Insur-
ance Workers case, as noted above. illu-
strate aspects of the personal gnevance 
remedy and the v1ctrmisation section, 
respectively. The purpose of this comment 
is to compare and contrast these two 
remedies It is submitted further, that not 
only are both cases legally correct, but 
also they faithfully follow the spirit of the 
lndustnal Relations Act 
Seen together. the two remedtes cover 
much the same ground; on the other hand, 
however, many victimisations would be pre-
union or pre-award and thus not covered 
by personal grievance as defined in s. 117 
Conversely, many personal grievances 
would not amount to vtct1misation Both 
remedies are for the union concerned (as 
opposed to the inJured worker) and, in 
addition, the Inspector of Awards may 
bring an act1on under section 150 but he 
would have no standing to pursue a per-
sonal grievance. Under the model clause 
set out 1n s. 117, the full powers of the 
Court, per subsection (7) come into play 
only when a d ismissal is found unjustifi-
able. If the grievance concerns something 
less than a dismissal, the court can make 
" a final settlement which shall be binding 
on the parties' per s. 117 (4) (i) but no 
specific powers are given to the Court. 
And under the form in s. 117, any remedy 
is discretionary - the Court can find an 
-., tnjustifiable dismissal" but give no com-
pensation to the worker and order neither 
reimbursement nor reinstatement See 
Smith v. Crown Crystal Glass 7 4 B.A. 3781. 
Under sect1on 150, on the other hand, lost 
wages must be awarded to a victimised wor-
ker - a penalty up to $400, plus rein-
statement and other compensation remain 
discretionary w1th the Court. And under 
s. 150 the Court has its full complement 
of statutory powers for any form of victim-
isation, including an injury less than dis-
missal. 
Finally, there is the contrast between the 
two sections thrown into relief by the two 
cases noted above: section 150 can be 
activated where there ts no award cover-
age, whereas s. 117 is tied to and requires 
the pre-existence of an award or agree-
ment. Section 117 Is contained In Part VII 
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of the lndustnal Relations Act and is part 
of a codified scheme to provide proced-
ures for settlements of every dispute of 
right. To allow the s. 117 remedy to take 
effect outside the award system would tend 
to defeat the very purpose of the code. 
The Abattoir decision shou ld encourage 
unions to extend their award coverage. 
On the other hand, s 150 must cover pre-
award situations, in order to protect and 
encourage unions in the act of formation, 
and unions in pursuit of their first agree-
ment. 
I nflat10nary wage settlements wi II con-
tinue to push workers up and over the bar 
in white collar awards; unions are in dan-
ger of losing coverage over senior employ-
ees The lesson for union officials in these 
two cases - for those unions with mem-
bership beyond the pale of award cover-
age m a geographic sense, and for those 
tosing coverage by operation of a bar -
1s to frame complaints, where ever pos-
sible, under the rubric of victimisation. Any 
union member, further more, whose salary 
pushes him over the bar should get specific 
confirmation of his individual contract of 
employment, and dispute settlement there-
under. ® 
BILL HODGE, Senior Lecturer in Law, 
Faculty of Law, University of Auckland. 
